NEWS: December 29, 2025
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Bird’s Eye View of the News
HOW VATICAN II COULD HAVE BEEN STOPPED –
Since this past December 8 marked the 60th anniversary of the closing of Vatican II in 1965, many commentaries are being published. Taking advantage of this trend I will make my own comment here.
Prof. Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira was the Brazilian leader of a trio who had worked together for decades fighting the Revolution in the Church and in the State. The three included himself, Archbishop Geraldo de Proença Sigaud and Bishop Antonio de Castro Mayer. When the two Prelates were young priests, they were stationed in São Paulo and came to know the young Dr. Plinio whom they recognized as particularly gifted to lead them in that fight.
For more than two decades many landmark works came to light from this collaboration as I have already pointed out in other places (here and here).
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When Vatican II was convened by John XXIII, the three went together to Rome in October 1962. Prof. Plinio brought with him a delegation of about 20 men to assist in their planned action on the Council. Indeed, it was these auxiliaries who collected the signatures for the two great petitions to the Pope and the Council made by the Conciliar Fathers. To wit, the petition to condemn Communism (334 Prelates), and another to consecrate the world according to the request of Our Lady of Fatima (510 Prelates). Those two petitions made in 1962 were the initiative of Prof. Plinio. The Council ended and neither John XXIII nor Paul VI attended to those petitions.
As the two months of the First Session of Vatican II passed, Prof. Plinio realized that Progressivism had usurped the Council and was holding important positions that would decide its direction. Indeed, three of the four Moderators who controlled the discussions were progressivists – Cards. Suenens, Döpfner and Lercaro.
Further, many exponents of the Nouvelle Théologie (New Theology) were placed in the commissions to prepare the final documents – Congar, Rahner, Schillebeecks, de Lubac, Chenu among many others.
Also progressivist Episcopates, like the German one, which controlled powerful charitable organizations such as Caritas, Adveniat and others, exerted strong pressure over Bishops of missionary countries to vote according to their agenda. If these Bishops would not vote as they indicated, the Germans would cut their grants. To have an idea of the efficiency of this tactic, consider that only Brazil, which fell into this category of missionary country, had more than 300 Bishops in the Council and a great number of them relied on the grants of those German charitable organizations.
So, Prof. Plinio proposed to the two Prelates, Arch. Sigaud and Bishop Mayer, that they publicly reject this progressivist influence and declare in the final meeting of the First Session that they would not return to other Sessions because the enemy – Progressivism – had taken over that Assembly. This public rejection would be backed by strong arguments and documents demonstrating that what was planned to be installed in the Church had been condemned by the previous Magisterium and therefore could not be accepted.
Had the two Prelates made this stand, the press would have been there to film and photograph everything. Then, a press release would have been circulated throughout the world by that group of laymen accompanying Dr. Plinio. The great splash that this would have caused most probably would have stopped the Council.
Unfortunately, the two Bishops became fearful of the Assembly and the Pope, and they did not make this public statement.
What I am describing here as a disciple of Prof. Plinio who knew him for more than 30 years, now has evidence to document it.
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Three of those erudite and learned laymen who went to Rome with Prof. Plinio stayed there until the end of the Council to assist the two Prelates and to follow the events. They were close to the two Prelates to the point of habitually sharing meals with them.
After the Council closed, two of them wrote a declaration, which I reproduce below. This document was unknown until this month of December 2025 when the last of the two signers died. A person who was keeping that document made a copy of it public in an internet debate forum and a friend sent it to me.
The document was notarized in Brazil, which has a much stronger force in that country than in the U.S. There it is the equivalent here of a sworn declaration under penalty of perjury, which means it is a written statement of facts where the signer attests to its truthfulness, acknowledging he can be prosecuted for perjury if he knowingly lies.
In its Point 1, which is by far the most important, the signers declared that Bishop Castro Mayer recognized that had he listened to the suggestion of Prof. Plinio that I mentioned above, the Council would not have become the tragedy it became.
In its Point 2, which regards the approval of the Declaration Dignitatis Humanae on Religious Liberty, the signers mentioned the indecision of Mons. Lefèbvre caused by fear, which they witnessed. Mons Lefèbvre was an assiduous visitor at Arch. Sigaud’s quarters near the Vatican and was also familiar with those two lawyers.
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To understand well this Point 2 in the correct sequence of dates, I offer this chronology of the approval of Dignitatis Humanae:
As we can see (letter D), there were 70 Bishops who voted against it on December 7, including Mons. Lefèbvre. Nonetheless, all of those Bishops, including Mons. Lefebvre, later signed all the documents in response to the request/order of Paul VI.
What the document reveals is the instability and wavering position of Mons. Lefèbvre’s will, which is not a surprise, but rather a confirmation of what I have already analyzed.
A parallel observation: Given the letter of the Coetus telling its members to vote “no,” it becomes clear that when the signers of the declaration below – lawyers Figueiredo and Soares Corrêa – pressured the French Archbishop to vote "no," they were just echoing that general recommendation made by the Coetus to all the conservative Bishops (letter B).
Finally, why did those lawyers write the document below in 1989 and not earlier or later? I believe that they were moved to do so by the rupture of Bishop Mayer with Prof. Plinio and his union with Mons. Lefèbvre, which became public in 1988 when the two consecrated four Bishops in Écone against the express will of John Paul II, and placed themselves in a situation of schism.
Had those two Brazilian Prelates followed the suggestion of Prof. Plinio, there would have been no Vatican II crisis that would lead one of them into schism...
DECLARATION
The undersigned Pedro Paulo Figueiredo and Carlos Alberto Soares Corrêa, Brazilians, single, lawyers with the respective identification cards RG 6.083.259/SP and 6.072.516/SP, declare the following:
1. Being in Rome in December 1965, some days before Holy Christmas we were invited by His Excellency Bishop Antonio de Castro Mayer, then Bishop of Campos, to travel to the city of Assisi. Mr. Henrique Barbosa Chaves, who at that time was a collaborator of the Brazilian TFP, also was invited. Before we departed for Assisi, we had lunch in a restaurant on the exit road of Rome to that historic city.
At the end of the luncheon, Mr. Henrique Barbosa Chaves said to Bishop Mayer: “Your Excellency, the Council ended. What a tragedy this Council was for the Church!” And Bishop Mayer in a very serious tone, responded: “And the guilt belongs to Arch. Sigaud and me, who did not want to listen to Dr. Plinio.”
2. Some days before this fact, as we were in the seat rented by Arch. Sigaud at the Vila Alessandro III, which is very close to the Vatican, the French Archbishop Marcel Lefèbvre arrived. The seat was being closed and we were preparing to return to the Brazilian Embassy, where we had stayed during the Council. Mons. Lefèbvre said to us: “Tomorrow the vote on the scheme of ‘religious liberty’ will take place. I will vote ‘yes,’ because I do not want to stand against Paul VI.”
We showed him that it was necessary to vote “no,” and that it would certainly be a mortal sin to vote “yes.” He answered us: “To vote ‘no’ it is necessary to stand against Paul VI and you do not know how terrible it is to stand against the Pope and say ‘no.’”
We insisted with the Archbishop that it would be a mortal sin to [not] vote ‘no.’ He agreed and promised to vote against the scheme on religious liberty, which in fact he did on the following day.
São Paulo, October 12, 1989
Pedro Paulo Figueiredo
Carlos Alberto Soares Corrêa
Notary certified on October 26, 1989
For the copy of the original document in Portuguese click here
Prof. Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira was the Brazilian leader of a trio who had worked together for decades fighting the Revolution in the Church and in the State. The three included himself, Archbishop Geraldo de Proença Sigaud and Bishop Antonio de Castro Mayer. When the two Prelates were young priests, they were stationed in São Paulo and came to know the young Dr. Plinio whom they recognized as particularly gifted to lead them in that fight.
For more than two decades many landmark works came to light from this collaboration as I have already pointed out in other places (here and here).
Cardinals Suenens, Doepfner & Lercaro were chosen to be Moderators of Vatican II to imposed the progressivist agenda
As the two months of the First Session of Vatican II passed, Prof. Plinio realized that Progressivism had usurped the Council and was holding important positions that would decide its direction. Indeed, three of the four Moderators who controlled the discussions were progressivists – Cards. Suenens, Döpfner and Lercaro.
Further, many exponents of the Nouvelle Théologie (New Theology) were placed in the commissions to prepare the final documents – Congar, Rahner, Schillebeecks, de Lubac, Chenu among many others.
Also progressivist Episcopates, like the German one, which controlled powerful charitable organizations such as Caritas, Adveniat and others, exerted strong pressure over Bishops of missionary countries to vote according to their agenda. If these Bishops would not vote as they indicated, the Germans would cut their grants. To have an idea of the efficiency of this tactic, consider that only Brazil, which fell into this category of missionary country, had more than 300 Bishops in the Council and a great number of them relied on the grants of those German charitable organizations.
So, Prof. Plinio proposed to the two Prelates, Arch. Sigaud and Bishop Mayer, that they publicly reject this progressivist influence and declare in the final meeting of the First Session that they would not return to other Sessions because the enemy – Progressivism – had taken over that Assembly. This public rejection would be backed by strong arguments and documents demonstrating that what was planned to be installed in the Church had been condemned by the previous Magisterium and therefore could not be accepted.
Had the two Prelates made this stand, the press would have been there to film and photograph everything. Then, a press release would have been circulated throughout the world by that group of laymen accompanying Dr. Plinio. The great splash that this would have caused most probably would have stopped the Council.
Unfortunately, the two Bishops became fearful of the Assembly and the Pope, and they did not make this public statement.
What I am describing here as a disciple of Prof. Plinio who knew him for more than 30 years, now has evidence to document it.
Foreground, Prof. Plinio with lawyers Carlos Alberto Soares Corrêa & Pedro Paulo Figueiredo
After the Council closed, two of them wrote a declaration, which I reproduce below. This document was unknown until this month of December 2025 when the last of the two signers died. A person who was keeping that document made a copy of it public in an internet debate forum and a friend sent it to me.
The document was notarized in Brazil, which has a much stronger force in that country than in the U.S. There it is the equivalent here of a sworn declaration under penalty of perjury, which means it is a written statement of facts where the signer attests to its truthfulness, acknowledging he can be prosecuted for perjury if he knowingly lies.
In its Point 1, which is by far the most important, the signers declared that Bishop Castro Mayer recognized that had he listened to the suggestion of Prof. Plinio that I mentioned above, the Council would not have become the tragedy it became.
In its Point 2, which regards the approval of the Declaration Dignitatis Humanae on Religious Liberty, the signers mentioned the indecision of Mons. Lefèbvre caused by fear, which they witnessed. Mons Lefèbvre was an assiduous visitor at Arch. Sigaud’s quarters near the Vatican and was also familiar with those two lawyers.
During the Council a meal of the Coetus Internationalis Patrum - red arrows clockwise from the left: Lawyer Carlos Alberto Soares Corrêa, Bishop Antonio de Castro Mayer, Arch. Marcel Lefèbvre and Arch. Geraldo Proença Sigaud
- The document began to be discussed on October 14, 1965;
- On November 18, the Coetus Internationalis Patrum, which brought together the conservative Bishops of the Council, issued a letter to them recommending to vote “no.”
- On November 19, a pre-final vote took place in which 1,954 votes were in favor, 249 against and 13 votes were null.
- On December 7, 1965, Dignitatis Humanae received final approval in a solemn session: It had 2,308 votes pro, 70 votes against and 8 votes null.
- Later, Paul VI asked/ordered every Bishop of the Council to sign all of the Council's final documents; which in fact all of the Bishops did.
As we can see (letter D), there were 70 Bishops who voted against it on December 7, including Mons. Lefèbvre. Nonetheless, all of those Bishops, including Mons. Lefebvre, later signed all the documents in response to the request/order of Paul VI.
What the document reveals is the instability and wavering position of Mons. Lefèbvre’s will, which is not a surprise, but rather a confirmation of what I have already analyzed.
A parallel observation: Given the letter of the Coetus telling its members to vote “no,” it becomes clear that when the signers of the declaration below – lawyers Figueiredo and Soares Corrêa – pressured the French Archbishop to vote "no," they were just echoing that general recommendation made by the Coetus to all the conservative Bishops (letter B).
Finally, why did those lawyers write the document below in 1989 and not earlier or later? I believe that they were moved to do so by the rupture of Bishop Mayer with Prof. Plinio and his union with Mons. Lefèbvre, which became public in 1988 when the two consecrated four Bishops in Écone against the express will of John Paul II, and placed themselves in a situation of schism.
Had those two Brazilian Prelates followed the suggestion of Prof. Plinio, there would have been no Vatican II crisis that would lead one of them into schism...
The undersigned Pedro Paulo Figueiredo and Carlos Alberto Soares Corrêa, Brazilians, single, lawyers with the respective identification cards RG 6.083.259/SP and 6.072.516/SP, declare the following:
1. Being in Rome in December 1965, some days before Holy Christmas we were invited by His Excellency Bishop Antonio de Castro Mayer, then Bishop of Campos, to travel to the city of Assisi. Mr. Henrique Barbosa Chaves, who at that time was a collaborator of the Brazilian TFP, also was invited. Before we departed for Assisi, we had lunch in a restaurant on the exit road of Rome to that historic city.
At the end of the luncheon, Mr. Henrique Barbosa Chaves said to Bishop Mayer: “Your Excellency, the Council ended. What a tragedy this Council was for the Church!” And Bishop Mayer in a very serious tone, responded: “And the guilt belongs to Arch. Sigaud and me, who did not want to listen to Dr. Plinio.”
2. Some days before this fact, as we were in the seat rented by Arch. Sigaud at the Vila Alessandro III, which is very close to the Vatican, the French Archbishop Marcel Lefèbvre arrived. The seat was being closed and we were preparing to return to the Brazilian Embassy, where we had stayed during the Council. Mons. Lefèbvre said to us: “Tomorrow the vote on the scheme of ‘religious liberty’ will take place. I will vote ‘yes,’ because I do not want to stand against Paul VI.”
We showed him that it was necessary to vote “no,” and that it would certainly be a mortal sin to vote “yes.” He answered us: “To vote ‘no’ it is necessary to stand against Paul VI and you do not know how terrible it is to stand against the Pope and say ‘no.’”
We insisted with the Archbishop that it would be a mortal sin to [not] vote ‘no.’ He agreed and promised to vote against the scheme on religious liberty, which in fact he did on the following day.
São Paulo, October 12, 1989
Pedro Paulo Figueiredo
Carlos Alberto Soares Corrêa
Notary certified on October 26, 1989
For the copy of the original document in Portuguese click here
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